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PREFACE 
The purpose or t.bil paper is to (1) review t.he concept ot privileged 
cOll:llllll1ication (2) review the deve10pn9nt or the rule ot privileged 
communication (3) present an application ot tbe rule of privileged cOlmluniea-
tion t.o the guidance counselor for the first time baaed upon the Wigmore Rules 
2£. Evidence. the W1p1Ore appE'OAcb 18 well accepted in legal cirolel. S1n.oe 
no test cue 18 available on t.he quest.ion of Whether or not. a guidance counse-
lor is ent.itled to Pl"ivileged communication, the pm-pose bere il to determine 
whether or not. the guidance counselor baa a lepl beau tor a claim to that 
privilege. .Also it 18 hoped that it. wtll be clearly brought. out that in the 
absence or a statute a counselor has no claim to the privilege. Moreover , 
this study' 111 lim1ted only to the scope ot priv1.leaed conrnu.n1catlona and 
therefore, will not dlsouu the aspects ot po.sible 8\11ts tor malpractice or 
suits tor libel and. slander. 
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CHAPTER I 
AN INTRODUCTION 
The word, "cOU11.8EJlor lt with tI1IUl7 connotations bas been applied to la~rs, 
clergymen, adT1aors and basically to any 1nd1Y1du.a.l whose primary concern bas 
been the a1ding ot man tormented by problema. Stem1ng trOlll this develoJDent, 
the fulfillment or this concept haa been actualized in educational ciroles 
into a position termed the guidance oounselor. During the twentieth century 
the pidance oounaelor hU beoome V8'l7 firmly implanted in our school system .. l 
The guidance counselor by the V'f!Jr7 nature ot his role gathers data highly 
personal in cbaracterand C01I111lUnicated in a counseling relationship with the 
student in a very personal and intimate manner. 2 
Howeftr, the legal role ot the guidance counaelor has never clearly been 
defined espeCially in the realm ot priYilege conmmicat1on • .3 Therefore, the 
object or tbia paper nil seek to present the oomplete hiStory and development 
ot professional i.mmu.nity as it relates to gI1idance counseling. 
The purpose or 'this paper vill to be re-evaluate the role ot the guidance 
lArthur J. Jones aDd Leonard N. Miller, "The National Picture ot Pupil 
Personnel and Guidance Services in 195.3," The Bulletin or the National 
Association 2! Secondarl School Princip!la;-IxX'O'f!! {F8oru.ary, 1954),-1.35. 
2Tbomaa 11. Carter, "Protessional Immunity for Guidance CO'W'lIItelor,· 
Personnel and Guidanoe Journal, XXXIII (November, 1954), 15. 
- . 
3Ibld. 
-
1 
2 
counselor in relationship to professional tmmunity by presenting a complete 
history and development ot professional immunity. From this review this paper 
will endeavor to investigate what implications on professional immunity can be 
related to counseling. Profe.sor Carter b.u succinctly defiD8d the problem 
ImmunitY' in a legal sense, means a form or condition of exemption. 
Black detines it as 'an exemption trom pertorming duties which the law 
genaral17 requires other oi tizena to perform.' Hence a person, under 
certain prescribed conditions, may be immune £rom arrest or prosecution. 
Imtmmity is not an exemption or privilege merely to be enjoyed, it is a 
condition which by necessity accompanies certain official acts. 
"Privileged communications" are detined by Black as being 'in the 
law of evidence any communications made to a counselor, solicit.or or 
attorney, in protessional confidence, and which he i. not permitted to 
di wlge' J otherwiae called a "confidential cOlIII'Nllication." 
Modern statutory practice baa extended the right ot immuftity in 
regard to prirtleged cOl'mlUllicatioDB to oertain profeSSiOns, such as 
tbeolol7 and medicine, whose prutitioners are habitual17 and inevitably 
the reoipients of' oonfidential oommunications.4 
With this rmtahell view of' the problem we shall commence our study'. 
The protessional immlmitY' of' which we speak is probably more aptlY' termed, 
privilepd CGIIIlmlnicatlon. The term priTileged oCl1lmW1ication has two meanings 
within the scope of the law.5 In one sense it refers to oral or printed 
utterances which although defamatory are not actionable under the law. In 
this area the emphasis is upon libel and slander. In the other sense, 
"privileged communication" reters to communi~ation .Ade in a confidential 
4Ibid. 
-
'Francis J. Ludes and Harold J. Gilbert, eds., Corpus Juris Secundum, 
EVII (New York, 1957), p. 954. 
3 
relationship, that is recognized by law and not competent to be produced in 
court during the trial of a cue. 6 The rule of privileged communication has 
been Bought by many groups, but the la.w has been very slow to extend coverage. 
Common la.w has extended the prinlege of privileged communication only to the 
attorney-olient relationship. The development ot statutory law bas extended 
this privilege to other individuals and the relationships established therein. 
Thus, we rind a privileged communication relationship existing between husband 
and wif.,7 physician and patient8 priest and penltent9 and under certain set 
relations.10 
With these preliminary thoughts in mind a nutshell view ot the .;n-oblem, 
a pneral definition, and the breath ot the term's application, we shall turn 
our attention to the hutorical development ot privileged communication. Only 
atter we have firmly grasped the historical Significance ot the term will be 
able to tully envision its development and its application to the guidance 
counselor. 
7corpus Juris Secundum, OPe cit., p. 654. 
8~., p. 82). 
9~., p. 746. 
lOIbid., p. 742. 
-
CHAPTER II 
THE HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL IMMUNITY 
The history ot the privilege dates back lIlerely tour hundred years to the 
reign ot Elizabeth I.ll Prior to that time an individual COIlld not be compelle 
to testU'yJ thus, be could chose to testify or not to testify baaed upon bow 
be telt.12 However, in 1562 by Act ot Elizabeth I a pr;oovision vas established 
"tor the eervices of proce8s out of a.ny court of record requiring the person 
served to appear and to testity concerning any cause on the matter pending in 
the court under penalty of ten pounds beside8 damage8 to be recovered by the 
partyaggrieved • .,l) The reason for this de~ in development appears to reside 
in the tact that there was little need for such an act up to this ti1'll8. It 
appeared at its conception to be a very natural exception to the then novel 
right ot testimonial compulaion.14 The new act was hued upon the fundamental 
principle or government that the administration of justice is a mutual benefit 
llJohn Henry Wigmore, Evidence In Trials at Common Law, VIII (Boston, 1961 
~4) - - -p. ~ • 
12clinton De Witt, Privi1epd Communications between Physician and Patient, 
(Springtield, 1951), p. Ii. -
13Ibid. 
-
l4wigmore. 2£. !:!!.. p. 543. 
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to all members of a cotmnUnit,. and every competent citizen is under an obliga-
tion to turther it as tbe matter of public dut,.; that the personal sacrifice is 
a part of the necessary contribution tor the welfare ot the public .15 Arter 
the enactment, the courts were confronted with witnesses who refused to answer 
questions or testify on the grounds that their testimoll7 would breach a 
committroent ot confidential communication which the,. bad made based either on 
their personal honor or on public poliey. Thus, the theory ot exoluaion in 
those daya differs trom modern time in that the consideration was an objective 
rather than a au.bjecti ve one, atemming trom the oath ot honor ot the attorney 
16 
rather than from. the apprehension ot the cU.eat. The courts were then faced 
with the problem which still races us todq, namely whether or not justice 18 
truly served by extending the rule ot privileged communioations. However, as 
the centuries have passed, the law both in Or'eat Britain and in .A.meric&1'1 
jurisprudence has both ironically extended the privilege of non-disolosure in 
favor ot particular persons and at the s.e time bas limited the scope and 
application ot the original privilege.17 Broadly speaking the matters affected 
by the doctrine of privilege ruay be clualfiad as political, judicial, aooial 
and prote_ional. '!'he more widely known ot these privileges are those whioh 
relate to state secrets, political votes, trade secrets, religious beliets, 
inter-marital tacts and self-incriminating mattera. In terms ot' personal 
15alair v. U. s. (1918) 250 u.s. 273,281J 63L.Ed. 979J 395.01;. 461. 
- ~ ---- -- ............. -----
16 
Wigmore, 22. :!:., pp. 170-74, 113-14, 521. 
17,!!! ::! !!l.! (1951) 155 !!2:2.~. 345. 98 !,!2d 798. 
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relations the privilege bas been extended to husband wife, grand juries, petit 
juror, judge, arbitrators, public offices and government informers who furnish 
the govarment with eTidence of crime and that which 18 granted to an attorney 
acting in a profes,1onal capacity.l8 In some state. the privilege baa been 
extended into other personal relationships &uch &8 pbTaician-patient relation-
sb1pa.19 
Of' all of these relatiollllhlpa existing under the lav, the attorney-olient 
surely merits tb1. exsmption trom the laVe "'l'be first duty ot an attorney," 
it baa been said, "is to keep the secreta ot the client.,,2O In the beginning, 
the baais for the exemption rested in the honor ot the attorney, and it vas not 
until the 1100's that the concept vas ."itched so as to pt"otect the client and 
not the attorney. 
Tbua, the oldest ot the priTileps ot communications appears to be 
Ul'lqUestloned u tar back as the reign ot Elizabeth I.21 The privilege was 
recopized b7 Roman law although baaed upon a different. setting than that ot 
22 
the common law. In eS8ence, the privilege, &8 developed trom the courts ot 
common law, is that no attorney 18 permitted whether during or after the 
termination of his emplo1Jll&nt as woh, unles8 with hia client' II consent, to 
18 COlJ?2:! Juria Secundum, 2E.~.' pp. 782-822. 
19Ibid. 
-
2Or!llor !. Blacklow (18)6) 132 §!!i.. ~. 401, 406. 
21Berd v. lovelace (1517) 21 §!!I. RaR. 33; Dennis v. Codri~n (1580) 21 
E~.~~~ -
22Max Radin, "'l'he Privilege of Confidential CoD'llWlicatlons Between Lawyer 
and Client," XVI (CalU'ornla !!! Review (September, 1928), 487. 
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te.tit,. as a wit .. a. and dilcloae aD.7 oommu.ni.catlon, oral or documentary, 
made to bim as such attorneT by or on behalf ot client in tbe course and tor 
tbe purpose ot his employment, whether in reference to &nT matter as to whicb 
a diepute baa arisen or otherwise, or to disclose s.ny' advice given by him to 
bia oll8nt, provided hoveftr, that 8DT such oollll11Wl1cation is not made or advice 
given in furtherance ot &nT criminal or fraudulent purpose. The privilege 
applies not only to the attorney, but also to h18 eeoretary or clerical 
assistant. Furthermore, the client h1maelf cannot be compelled to disclose an)" 
cCllm\Ul1cation between himael!, and hi. attorne)", which hil attorne,. would not 
23 disclose without his consent. HoV8ftr, it should be noted that nothing 
pre'ftlnta the client from 'VOluntarily giving forth confidential 1nf'ormation, it 
he so desires. 
III ~ !. Lovelace the solicitor wu exempted from examination touching 
upon the cue. 24 In Dennis !. Codr~n the court indicated on a motion to 
exam:1ne one OldnortbJ 
touching a matter in variance, wherein he bath been of 
counsel, it is ordered he shall not be oompelled by subpoena 
or otherviae to be examined upon arrr matter concerning the 
same, wherein be the said Mr. Oldsvorth vas of oounsel either 
bT the indU'terence choice of both ~~ie. or with either of 
them by' re8.8on ot &ny' annuit;r of fee.25 
In IelW!l !. KelW!l, the soU.oitor wu permitted to be questioned only upon 
23w.tamore, 21!. ill., p. 542. 
24Berd !. Lovelace (1577) 21 !!!I.. Rep. 33. 
2Sneun1s !. CodriDatO~ (1580) 21 ~. Rep. 53. 
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those matters whiah in no way touched upon his role or protession as a solici-
tor.26 rue same idea is confirmed in Onbie' s Case in which the courts 
stated "a lawyer who was of counsel may be examined upon oath as to the matter 
of agreement, not to the validity or an as5llrance, or to matter of coones 1. 21 
Still upholding this concept in waldron !. ~ the court declared that the 
la~r is ~t bound to make answer tor things which may disclose the secrets 
ot his client's c&se ... 28 More explicitly in Sparke !. Middleton, they declared 
that the lawyer could testify only to "such things as he either knew betore he 
.. ot oounael or that came to his knowledge since bT other persons.29 
From this development with some exception it is conceded that the purpose 
ot the privilege i. to encourage the employment or prote.sional advisers bT an 
indlyidual in need ot such services and to promote abeolute freedom ot 
cou.ultation bT removing all rear on the part of the client that his attorney 
may be compelled to dilclose in court the communications or the acquired 
information in the course ot his profel.ioul emploJ'Mnt. 30 'ftlis is an 
important tact which we shall examine later as .. make applications to the role 
2~el1f!l !* Kel"'&l (1,80) 21 !!I. !!E.. 47. 
270nbie E!!! (1642) 82 !!I. RaE. 422. 
28 Waldron !. ~ (16,4) 82 Eng. Rep. 853. 
29sparke !. Middleton (1664) 83 ~. ReE. 1019. 
30Altbough generall)r accepted one need not look too far to find objections 
It is not 11kal7 that the privilege will be abolished. Legal periodical 
literature has ~ such examples. 
9 
ot the guidaDce counselor. The essential element here 1s that the courts have 
recognized the needs of • client to haw Mcreoy 80 that the olient can best 
crup and work through hi. cue in court. We ahall reserw implioations aDd 
Warenoes upon this tact tor later consideration. 
AltlxNlb almost UD1wraal1~' approved by' both beach and bar th:l.a privilege 
baa not escaped critioism and the .. ath ot ~. In England Jeremy Bentham was 
perhaps the first to denounce 1t)1 In America, Chiet Justioe Appleton, at the 
SUpreme Court ot Masaachueetta, wu equal17 ,"bement in deDouncinl the 
priv11ep. 
'I'he rule at law by which the o0l'1t1dent1al cOlllllU.llioations 
ot the cl1Emt to bi. attorney ,. olott. Caiq] in:v101able 
and oompu.leory .. ereoT, 18 diahonorable and dell"acl1ni to 
the legal prot.aion--1njurioua to the public, and 
entire17 Ul1Deceaaary to the client tor &D7 pr'oper end 
legtt1mat.e purpose. Were the rule aboll8hed, the relation 
betwen the client aDd the attor_YJ vbereftr it ex1ated, 
would be conterred within the 'bouDda ot integr1tT and 
enlightened publio poliq, .. it should be.32 
Howftr, the ooarta realized that the privilege .. an obetacle in the 
oexaplete disoovery ot truth. Thua, the doctrine UD.der1rent a change in the 
1700's. '1'b8 court. were faced on the ODe lide with the pri'rilege as an 
obataole to the d1acoftl7 ot 1a"utb and on the other baud with a new tbe0I7 
whiob required an ampl1t1cat10D at the privilege. "The new theory looked to t 
neces.ity ot providing subjectively for the ol1ent freedom of apprehension in 
consulting his legal adv1sor •• 33 The new ooncept. existed side by side for 
3lJeretn7 Bentham, !!!!. L1m1ta 2! Jur1af!j1d!nce, (New York, 1951), passim. 
32ne Witt, ~. ~., p. 8. 
3Jwipore, ~. ~., p. 543. 
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nea.rlT a half' a century and then a !'uller development. ot the new concept 
began.34 One ot the ironic factor8 of this development i8 that details of the 
privilege were still in their tormative Stage8, in the 1800's. Actually, the 
t'WO struggled side by aide ao dUterently and "at merging into one. Perhaps, 
no rule ot evidence bad so ~unsettled pointa until the middle ot the 
6ighteenth century • .35 
It ill perhaps best at this point to au.1ft up the nature ot the development 
or this ru.le ot evidence. First, the privilege did not eX&1'l1pt the client, tor 
the point ot honor stemmed not trom him but from the attorney • .36 Tb1s concept 
bad little practical value except in ans_ring a bill ot discovery, tor all 
durina that period the party was privileged in common law courts trom testUy-
ing in the trial ot civil eases. However, as the newer tbeOl"y began to develop 
the client began to be exempt frcxn making discovery ot c011lO.\Ulieations re latina 
to the very case at the bar. Bowver J with the pressure ot the older tMOl"Y, 
it still had to be insisted trom the bar that "the privilege is that ot the 
client and not ot the attorney.·.37 
The early decision ot Justice Buller in 1772 p&8aed unheeded. He pro-
claimed that "it is the privilege ot the cli3nt and not ot the counselor the 
.35~., p. 544. 
36Ibid. 
-
37cre!'!OUlh !. Oaakee (1833) 39 !!!I.. Rep. 68. 
11 
attorney_,,38 Thus, when in 1801, Lord Eldon declares "the privilege of the 
client and the publiC, tf the new theory begins to bear tru.it.39 
UDder the older theory the attorney exemption was limited to communica-
tions received linee the begbming ot the litigation at the bar and tor its 
pwopo.s on17. But th1a v1ewpoint was s 10w17 losinl diatavor. Chier Baron 
Borden in 1743 declared. 
Wben the cue 14 ended, he u then only to be considered with 
respect to his former employer &II one man to another and then the 
breach ot trust does not tall within the jur1ediction ot the Cgurt, 
tor the Court cannot determine what is torm, but what 18 law.4 
Under the newer theory the concept of the privilege wac first extended to 
include commnicatioll8 during other litigation, th9n in term. ot contem.plat.ion 
or litigation, then to a controveray not under litigation am then tinally to 
consultation tor legal advice, with or without litigation in sight. The 
shackles of' the older theory were not thrown ott until the 1070's when the eaur 
comented when a counsel cited the earlier ruling as precedents in Minet !. 
MorfJ!!!' RThe law hu nov attained to a rooting which made me a litt.le 
surpr1aed to hear the matter n-opened • .,hl 
One ot.btr point under the older theory was that the priv11ep could be 
38W1gmore , !>R - m·, p. 54h. 
39wrip t !. J:!Ner (1801) 31 !.!!i. !!E.. 1051_ 
40Anaele;r !. ~ 2! A?J!lesea (1793) 17 ~ ~. !!:. 1139, 1240. 
4~1Det !. Morl!!! (1873) 8 L.R. Ch 361, 366. 
12 
waived by the attorneY' 1£ he so desired. The Oourt would not admonish the 
attorney it he deoided to break the trust. ''TIle court oannot determine what i 
honor,·42 said Chief' Baron Borden in 1743. Although it is sate to as.ume that 
INCh action wu not UIU&l.l;y 1;alcen under the older t,heory, it retarded the 
development ot the newr theory tor several decades. Tb.us, the teeling arouse 
in the 1700-. based on the rule. ot the 1;:00'. tbat a client should have and 
doe. need complete contidence in hi. lapl adv1aer in order for him to .. cure 
the beat representation without appreheu10ns became implanted in the theory 0 
the rule ot ev1denoe. Tbua, Wigmore 8W111'1&rize. the theor)" betore he begins an 
exbauetive anal7s1a of each component ot his INDfII&I"7 thusly. 
wb.ere legal advioe ot 8D7 kind 1a 801lght trom a prote •• ieul 
legal adri.eer in his capacity as such the communication 
relat1Dg to that pw."pOae made 1n oontldence by a cU.ent, is 
at his iDstance permanently proteoted tor diaclosure by 
h1m8elt or by the legal adv1aer except the protection 'be 
1iI&ived.43 
With this rather tmCOinct and apt ~ ot the application of the 
prlv1lep to the attorney-clieDt relationship, we shall now trace the develop-
ment ot the privilege u it pertains to the !>bya1oian-patient relationship. ir/i 
wll note bow the application dUfer.. This is important in determining the 
role of the gu1dance oounselor and hi. 1ftI!1unity. 
Probably contrary to popular concept1on confidential cOl'lJmU.n1catlon bet wee 
pbyaio1an and patient i8 not privileged under CGmZlk>n law.44 Privilege 
42AD8eley !_ ~ 2! Anglesea, supra. 
43tiigroore, 2E. :!!., p. 554. 
44r-1utual Life Insurance Co. v. OWen (191» III Ark. 558 • 
........... --- --- ...... - ----- ----
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col'llf!l.Ull1catlon bas been establ18bed by the rule ot c1 vil law in some jurisdio-
tiona.45 Outside the courtroom, the physioian is l.tt to the dictates ot hi. 
consoience I his protessional ethics and &n1' other f'oroe. whioh might bear upon 
him on the question ot whether or not he should disclose certain intonnatlon 
eommurdcated to him by his patient. However, when called to testify in court, 
the p~ician could not retuee to te.tUy nor could the patient objeot to the 
pb,ys1ciarl·. testimol\T in sp1te ot wbateyer eff'ect the testimol\T would have upon 
the richta, reputation or feelings of' either the pat.ient or the pb)rBician.46 
The underl¥1nl principle was that the disclosure ot the whole truth vas 
es .. nt.1al. to the proper adrUnistratlon ot justice and that the need tor it tar 
outweighed arq consideration of' protes8ioMl confidence.47 AlthouCh, the 
Court. of' England u .. have seen have dneloped this privilege and have 
aaaidioua1.7 applied it to the attorney-client relationab.1p, the courta have 
ref'uaed to extend the prinle. to the members ot the medical protession. The 
extension in America haft been _de by statutory law.48 nlinois baa no 
prinl.. tor pbTs1cians. 49 
4'For one such an example see Wen's Louis1lM. Statutes Anaotated, Section 
15: 477 (19S1) 
46aol le !. Northwestern National. ReUet Association (1897) 10 !.!!. 35. 
47ne Witt. 22- !,!:!., p. 6. 
48Ibid., p. 13. 
-
49Jaclalon !. Pills'!<!!7 (1878) 1t4 !-!. ed 537, )80 n1. 554. 
The first epoch-marking case of the common law concerning this privilege 
occurred in 1116 in the trial of the Duchess or Kingston. The Duchess was 
triad before the House of wrds on a oharge of bigamy. Mr. CeAr Hawldnes, an 
eminent surgeon, who had attended the Duohess, her husband the the child, had 
been summoned to court. v!b8n asked whether the accused had. admitted the first 
marriage the witness replied; ttl do not know how tar anything that baa come 
before me in a confidential trust in my protelsion, should be discloeed 
consistent with m:y professional honor .,,50 The Earl of Mansfield in his otfice 
as Lord High stewart at the trial, ruled that the question mwst be answered and 
further OOVIllentad: 
I suppose Mr. Hawldns roean.s to deTlllr to the question upon the 
grOWld that it came to his knoWledge some way from his being 
employed as a surgeon for one or both parties. 
It all your lordships will acquiesce, Mr. Hawkins will under-
stand that it is your ju.dgment and opinion that a surgeon has no 
privilege, whether it i8 a material question, in civil or a 
criminal cue to know whether the parties were married, or whether 
a cbild was born, to sq that his introduction to the parties was 
in the coure'3 of his profession, and in that way be came to the 
lmowl.edge of it. I take it for p"tmted, t.hat it Mr. HawI.dns under-
stands that it is a satisfaction to him, and a clear justification to 
all the world. It a eurgeon va. voluntarily to reftal these Moreta 
to be saved, he would be guilty of a breach ot honor and of a great 
inducretion; but t.o give that. information to a court of justice 
which by the law of the land be is bound t.o do, will never be 
imputed to him a. any indisoretion whatever.51 
Thua, the words of Lord }1ansf1eld formulate the ba.sis for continued 
c0:nmon law rules. However, several points lIl'I1st be noted in this cue. First, 
50DucMas ~ K lAg.ton !!:!!1 (1776) 
5lIbid• 
-
20 How St .. Tr., 355. 
---
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it was the surgeon, Dr. Hawkine, who objected to giving testimony, not the 
Duchess. Secondly, the question asked related to the fact ot a. previ.oWl 
marriage and in no way to a medical concern discowrab1y by observation or 
examination, or to 8lJ¥ communication by' the patient with reference to her 
condition ot health. 'l'he question itself' vas indeed without the scope ot 
medicine.52 However, the courts haw con.at.rued and applied the Manstield 
decision to compel the pbyB1c1an to duclose all relevant tacta ot which be hu 
knowledge whether such facts concern the pl'q'sical imperfections ot the patient, 
his healtb, or otberwJ.ee .53 
BowYer, t.h8 common rule remains in force in England despite the efforts 
in recent years by the presaure groups ot the medical protassion to enact a 
Chqe.54 
1'be nrst privilege on non-disolosure ot the physician patient relation-
ship in Anglo-American oirolee .. areated by the legislature ot the State ot 
New York in 1828.55 'Whatever prompted the laVlJl8.kers to enact the statute is 
not olear. However, it bas been oontended that the revisers were influenced by 
56 
a comment ot Mr. Justice Buller in \'/1180n !. Ruta1t. It appears that there 
was a compelling pressure to gi,", the medical profession the same cloak ot 
immunity which had been given to the legal. protession. The original statute, 
13. 
52w1lson !. Raskall (1792) 4 ~. ~. 753, 760. 
5.3aarner !. Ga.rner .36 !!!:!_ Rep. 196. 
54DeW1tt, 2E. ill., p. 12. 
55New York Revised Statutes (1820) n 406, Part II e. VII Art. 8 paragraph 
--_ ..................... 
56wilson !. Rastall supra. 
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wh1ch has served as the bas:Lc pattern ot other states and ot.her cotmtr1es, 
proT1dea that t 
No person duly authorized to practice medicine or surgery sball 
be allowed to disclose any intormat.ion whioh he may have acquired in 
attending &aT patient, in a professional character, and which 
1ntormation was necessary to enable him to prescribe tt:"I" such pat.ient 
u a piv'aician, or to do atV' act tor him as a surpon.;:'7 
During the oentury following its enactment a large number of states, and United 
States poness1ons enacted s1milar statutes oontaining the test,1lnonial privi-
lege. Unf'ortunately the lawmakers sacrificed clarity tor brevity 80 that 
enauiDg years not.e that revisiOns had to be made 80 that the existing statutes 
bear little reaemblance to the original.58 
Tbtt basic priDCiplea ot the statute are the s_, but they differ in their 
wording, content, scope and lim1tat.ions.59 The priv11ege is extended to 
licensed physicians and in a tew cuee it has been extended to nurses and 
60 
co.ntident.1Al cler:i.cal assistants. In New York, the privilege baa been accorded 
to dent.18ts. 61 The extent and scope of the jur1Bdiotion' s divergence can be 
visuaU.zed in the fact that in 80_ jurisdictions it may be invoked in civil 
57New !!!:! Rev18ed statutes, 22. ill,. 
58Alabama , Arizona, Arkansu, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentuoky, LouiSiana, l-!ichigan, Minnesota, 11ississlppi, 
l-H.esouri, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, New MexiCO, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Sout.h Dakota, Utah, Uashi~ton, VJest 
Virginia, Wisconsin, 1Y'yoming. 
59ne Witt, !!E. ~., p. 17. 
6olbid• 
-
61Ibid• 
-
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actions, in some areas in both oivil and cr:1.mina.l litigation; whereas in 
louisiana, it oan be cl.ailMd only in criJninal action.62 In moat cues the 
prohibition of disclosure applies only to information which was necessary to 
enable the physician to presoribe tor or treat the patient. In a tew states 
the law exctud9S any' evidence obtained while treating the patient whether it 
be obtained in cOnjunction with the treatment ot the patient or not.63 In 
Kansas, the statute prohibits a physioian trom disclosing an)" information 
relating to t.he patient's condition, injury, or the tUne, manner, or 
circwnatance under which the ailment wu incurred.64 In Pennsylvania"Worma-
tion" is not protected "only communication" made by tbe patient to the 
physician ''which shall tend to blacken the character ot the pat.ient" are within 
the scope of the stat.ute.6$ The privilege in New Mexico, is limited "to any 
real or wpposed veneral or loathsome disease, except in cues involving t.he 
66 Worknum's Compensation Law where the soope of the privilege ia enlarged. In 
Kentucky, the privilege is limited to cases whioh have to do with the subject 
of Vit&l Statist.ics.67 
The early statutes made no provision tor the waiver of the privilege. How 
ever, the new statutes grant the right ot waiver by t.he person, his 
62Ibid• 
-
6)~. 
64Ibid. 
6'Ibid. 
-
66Ibid• 
-
67Ibid. 
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representat.ive or act.ing in his place. However, there is a tendency in some 
statutes to withhold the privilege in those cases where t.he patient or his 
representat.ive has voluntarily placed the issue ot the patient's condition ot 
health in the ease. In certain areas, such as abortion or illegitimacy, the 
physician may be oompelled to teatif."y.68 These examples should suffice to show 
the divergence ot meaning and application ot the privilege. It theretore 
behooves an individual to tully examine and understand the law as it applies 
to hie particular situation in his particular legal jurisdict.ion. 
ODe tinal point wb1ch needs clarification is that we have not been con-
cerning ourselves with a question of medical or prole.ional ethics outside the 
courtroom. The statute places ita soope only within the confines ot the court-
room. ~'hatever the physician wishes to com.mu.ni.cat.e outside the courtroom is 
beyond the statute's limitations. The physician is only bound by bis medical 
and protes.ional ethics, and bis conscience. It is generally agreed that such 
a disclcaars would be a violation of his medical and professional propriety. 
It a pb1aician would indisoreetly disclose such information at a confidential 
nature, be would not violate the stat.ut.e .. bOlfever reprebensible his conduct 
might be. 69 The statute only grant.s the right to seal the lips ot the 
ph;ysician in t.he courtroom, it t.he pat.ient so desires. But, the statute does 
not. limit t.he physician tram communicat.ing this idea to a.ny Tom, Dick, or Harry 
trom Ooast to Coast. 
68Ibid• 
-
Although to some degree w bave discussed the cWveloJRlnt of professional 
bmun1~ in the preceed1Dg cbapt.er. Wbat. we shall endeavor bere 18 to show 
bow the pr1.v11ep generally operates and 18 generally applied 1n American 
jv.toiJIp.ru.d&nce_ Thie d.eftlopment baa been reached and ia still continuing to 
be defined as 11 tlpt,ion ar1se •• 
The first factor under constderat1oD is that the principle that certain 
relatione &r.'"e eontident:1.&l aDd certain commnn1catiol'l8 priv11epd apiut 
d1acloaure by III witness its a rule of ev1dence public pollcy. 1'be rule as .. 
know it. in American court. Jur~ 18 tOllftded upon atat1ltory law in O&IQ 
other than at.t.ol"'l1l9Y'-cl1eftt.. . hen oertain confidential relati.oQs exist between 
two in.d1Y1duala the law will not eo.1 or permit one ot the partiea to violate 
the con.f'ldence by test:lt'y'1.Qg without the consent or the other party-70 '!"bi. 
refera to the oormunicatioa which wu _de to t.t. OM part,. by the other party 
n 
in the oont1denee in wtd,ch the relation wu 1up:1.red_ ~re, a statute 
mald.ni both parties competent and compellable to teatitjr oannot be conat.ru.ed to 
open 1:J:.ItJ door to a rull inquiry into auch privileged ~catlons. 72 Thu 
70state !. F1.znn 251 ~"!,!. 2d 69, 73 J 363 ~. 106. 
11,q_2. !. ~ D.C .K.!. 84 !.. SUa:- 967 
72Sa'!l!! !. Stanlel 1 S.2d 21, 24J 241!!!. 39. 
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rule of evidence only' applies to that part of testimony which is deemed 
privileged. 'fbus, a witness must testU'y to all that knowledge relating to 
the case which does not come under the scope of privilege. In the case!! !!!. 
Herrnstein, the court declared that the rule was conditional rather than 
absolute. 
It ought to follow that no limitation of such nature should be 
recognized unless it is clearly demanded b,y some specific important 
extr1naic policy and that every intendment should be made against 
such demand.13 
And yet clearly indicated--the statutory privileges are absolute in the sense 
that even in matters involving public justice, a court may not oompel dis-
closure of confidential communications thus privileged.14 
What 18 clearly accepted is that since privilege is a matter by statute, 
then an absence of statutes means that no privilege exists .15 The questions 
of whether or not the statute should be loosely or broadly construed depends 
upon the authority making the interpretation.76 The rule applies to all 
testimony including bero ..... trial examination and it extends only to the 
communication. 77 
The courts have generall,. upheld the historical concept of the newer 
theory that the public has the right to know the full truth and u such it 
1J!! !:! Herrnstein 6 Q!!!2. ~. 260, 266. 
7Ustiles !. Clifton Spr1ys Sanitarium ~., D.C. My 74 !:. Supp. 407. 
'7SIbid. 
-
76pa;rkhurat y. Citl 2! Cleveland 11 l!. 29. 
17weu T. Weia 72 NE 2d 245; 141 Ohio St. 41. 
_ ................. - .....---- ........ 
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otten handicaps justice, but the ultimate value of the privilege bas been 
accepted despite this recognition.78 
The most important tact i8 that the privilege is only applicable to those 
relations whioh are recognized under the law. Thus, if' two individuals enter a 
relationship which they consider conf'identlal, and it this relat.ionship is not 
recognized under the law, then no priT1.1ege exiats and one or both parties must 
testif)' to the nature of' the communication in that relationship. 79 
!!'! !:! Alber.! ~lndl!2: !!! Memoria}. HoBP!tal indicated that any- fact which 
was plainly observable to anyone could not be held to be privileged.80 Follow-
ing this concept !l!!! !. Industrial Commission 2! Ohio held that if' a third 
party, not a member of the privileged relation, overhears by acoident or intent 
and is not a neceaaa.:ry interlll8diary, such a person may testify as to the 
oommunication, -being absolutely unaffected by the law of privilege.nal 
The rule does not apply to attesting witnesses.82 Moreover, the privilege 
does not terminate with the cessation or the protected relationship, but 
continue. thereafter.83 Whether or not testimo~ shall be considered 
privileged will depend upon the law or the state and in the case ot t'ederal 
190. 
78Connectiout Import 22,. !. Cont1.neJ-ial P:1~tilli!!l C~:E. D.C. Conn 1 FRD 
79Hutokiaa v. Ernst 45 S.Ct. 201, 235J 235 u.s. 684, 50 L.Ed. 423. 
;;;;;.; ......... ~ - - ....... -- .... -.. 
ao!!! !:! Albert IJ.ndley !!! Memorial Hospital C.A.NY. 209 !: 2d 122. 
8l!l!:!! !. Industrial Commission 2! ~ App 12 HE 2d 9,']7. 
82Jaokson !. PiP'!J~ supr:a. 
83Marti!l y_ ~ 1~6 P2d 681J 22 Was 2d 505. 
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courts it will reside upon the law ot the state in which the case arose. 84 
The rule 18 to be applied only to those relationships to which the privilege 
applie., and is explicitly expressed in the statute.8S 
Co!J'A!! Jur~~ Secundum bas aptly summarized the relationships which bave 
been recognized under certain o1rCUflUStanoeS: 
It baa been said to be universally coneeedad that the privileged 
communications are those made by a person holding a certain 
confidential relation in particular to that ot ph7sician and patient, 
attorney and cUant, clergyman or priest and penitent, husband and 
wite, government and informer, assignors in certain instance. and 
parties wben the adverse parties are personal representatives ot 
deceased persons or olaim or deferred as heirs, etc. The tendency 
il not to extend the cluses to whicb. the pri 'lfilege trom disclosure 
is granted, bu.t to restrict that privilege. So a privileged 
oommunioation statute afford8 proteotion only to those relationships 
specif'ioalty named therein. The court mq not prescribe such 
privilege in behalf ot any particular class and the legislature alone 
mq do 80. The verT tact that testiJaouial privileges are bued on 
speoifio oontidentia' relations is proot that they do not extend to 
all sucb relations.Sf 
Therefore, unle8s speCifically stated, we may not assume that a privileged 
relationship exists. Theretore, what an individual mal' teel 18 a confidential 
relatioll8hip, is not a oontidential relationship unless recognized under the 
law. Thus, in Illinois there exiats QO recognition ot the J)h1'Bician-patient 
relationshiP.87 Moreover J the conau.nications to a spiritual adviser have 
privilege only 1£ accorded by statute. The communication among other 
840.5. First Trust Co. of st. Paul v. r:ansas City Lite Insurance Co. C.C.! 
Him 79-Fed w. - - - - - - - -
85We1a !. !!!!! supra. 
86corp!! ~uris Secundum, ~. .2.ll., p. 141. 
87 Jackson !. Pillaburz aupra. 
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stipulations must be made to the clergyman in his professional capacity and in 
the course ot his ecclesiastical functions. Horeowr the conmllnication to a 
spiritual adviser must be made by a person seeking religious or spiritual 
advice, aid or comfort.88 '!'be oommunication must be penitential in character 
and proper in order to enable the spiritual advisor to discharge the function 
of his ottice.59 Finally the communication II'I.lst have been made and received in 
confidence .90 
In the state of nli.nois only the attorney-cl1ent privilege 18 recognized. 
In general, however, from the deoi.ion ot Jackson !. Plllabuq', the rule as to 
confidential communication such as those bet1l8el'l attorney and client, does not 
apply to attesting 1f1tne •• es.9l Moreover, the common law rule that no 
privilege &8 to COl'IRUlicationa between pb1'81oian and patient ex1ats still 
prevail .• eless chaQged by statute was specifically deolared in Cronin y. Court 
ot Honor 1st Dutrict. 92 
-. --... . 
From. this analysis of both the hutory, origin and deve lopnent, we are 
able to no~ that the pri v1.1ege applies on.l.y' to the attorney-olient re1ationsh1' 
uDier oommon law. Secondly, the privilege has been extended to other 
confidential relations by statutory law. In no place has the investigation 
88Johns~n y. Cor~nwealth 221 ~J 2d 87. 
89Ibid. 
-
90Ibid. 
-
91Jackso;n !. f!!l!bury supra. 
92cronin y. ~ 2f Honor !!! Dist.r~?:t: 187 III ~. 480. 
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pointed out that the guidance counselor comes under the scope of privileged 
conlIl1wl1cation and professiona.l immunity. The courts seem to have been very 
specUic that unless explicitedly stated one haa 00 basis upon which to aseume 
that the privilege would be extended to the guidance counselor. Moreover, at 
the time ot the investigation there were no cases pending on this question. 
Furthermore, U the rule of privilege were to be applied to guidance counselors 
the guidance counselor would probably be accorded no more extension than that 
1Ihich exists to other privileged relationships. 'l'he MOat important factor as 
the history and the developnent of the privilege have 80 aptly pointed out i8 
that the public i. more concerned with the discover,. of the truth than the 
desire tor the privilege and that when the privilege 18 accepted, it is tor the 
client's benefit. Thus, a guidance counselor could never use the privilege to 
protect himself' or to prevent his ooanents from being subject to suit. '1.'he 
counselor should be fully aware that the client it he 80 desires, uaum.1ng a 
privilege under the law to ex1at, the client may disclose any or all 
communications made in a counseling relationship. 
The relationship of the guidance counselor and tba law is our in1nediate 
concern. \\1hile the guidance counselor may find himself involved in 
litigation tor malpractioe, a libel and slander suit, for testimony as an 
expert witness, our concentration has been upon one aspect the counselor's 
world, namely: privileged oormmnication and the guidance counselor. To date 
there have been no cases or litigation betore the courts which might sbed 
light upon what the nature of privileged communication and the guidance 
counselor. 
Moat individuals in counseling look to David W. Louisell, a law,er, whose 
speciality concerns paychiatrists and psychologists' rights under the law. His 
articles directly concern pSl"bologists, but as McGowan and Schmidt state: 
"its implications tor all protessional counselors are obvious. n93 Although the 
most diract way would be to ex.am1ne guidance counselors and their role with the 
law, it is beat to examine the Louisell approach so that we can eXUline what 
inferences might appty to guidance counselor in his role ot a psychological 
93John F. McGowan and Lyle D. Schmidt, Counaeli!!l' Readil!is!! Theon !!':! 
Practice, (New York, 1962), p. 605. 
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or, possessing a I-'h.D. in the rield or coun."eling, i::1 his role as a counseling 
psychologist. 
Perha!,s OM of the most concise and yot. com,prehen."ive reviews ot the 
literatu..""O on this subject can be round in Volu."n.e I Nurrber 1 or the Counselor 
Education ~P!"ruion. Thi. Fall, 1961, issue looka at all the major articles 
concerning the counselor in the legal world.94 Fra.nk W. Miller and Richard J. 
Simpson consider the areas of the cOWUIelor as an expert witne.s, the area ot 
privileged ca.mnunication, and the area ot libel and slander.95 Marq readers 
are quick to note the Iverson !. Boet case in which the parents ot a student. 
who committed suicide atter term1natina counseling irJt.ervievs with a professor 
ot education, were 8Ui.ng the professor on the basi. that the professor should 
haw notitied the parent. of the girl's condition.96 For it the professor had 
notified the parents of the girl'. condition, tbs parents contended, then the 
parents could have taken prEtwnt:1:ve lISaauras and the girl would not have 
committed suioide. '!'be court ruled in favor ot the professor indioating that 
be was not responsible tor the girl's suicide and that be had no commitment to 
notify' tbe girl' 6 p&1:"ents since he oould not pre-detem1ne her aotions. 
However, most ot the artioles in this journal tollow the same line of 
94lbld. 
-
9~ank '\IT. Miller and Richard J. Simpson, -Some Legal Implications of the 
Client-Counselor Relationship--A Review or the Literature, ft Oounselor Eduoatior. 
$Upervialon I (Fall, 1961), 19-29. . _. 
96Iver80n !. BoSU!:' 10 Wia 2d, 129. 
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ot thinking &8 previously oited artioles in t.hat. t.hey do not reter d1reotly to 
the gaJ.ds.nce cou.nselor. In an article entitled, "A Suggested Privilege for 
Confidential Communications with Marriage Counselor," the author in the 
Pe!!!!llvan1a. !!!! ReTiew suggest that the aspect of the privilege ot confiden-
tial communioation should be extended to marriage oounselors. 97 The journal 
alao auaesta 'l'homu M. Carter '8 article which we have mentioned in our paper 
1n1t1al4r and which _ will subsequently mention.98 Martha Cottle otters an 
artiole with a most interesting title, "Wltnesaes--Priv11ege Comsmmication to 
Psychotherapists. "99 At the onaet the reader recei vea the 1111pression that this 
might be a moat exhaust.ive article on t.he subject. However, Mias Cottle 
presents a briaf rel'JUIfle of the Taylor case and Bender. !. Ruvell. Both ot 
whioh will be discussed later in the paper. John J. Cusock advocates in his 
article, "Qualify Your Psychologists," the licensing and dat1n1ng ot the rola 
of the psyohologist in the legal world. loo John L. McCary in, "The 
Psychologist in CO'Ill'"t, It in the Chi?!C2 ~ ~ Re".r!aw gives a brief' and 
adequate presentation of the role ot the psychologist in oourt.10l Fina1~, 
97Anonymous. "A Suggested Privilege for Confidential Communications with 
Marriage Couuelors, If University of P!!'!'!llvania Law Rev1ew cn (December" 
1957), 266-78. - _. 
9CCarter, 2,2- ~. 
99Martba Cottle, wwttne8ses--Privilege·,-Communioation to Psychotherapists, 
Universitl 2! Kansas !!!! Review VI (May, 1956) I 597-~. 
lOOJohn J. Cusack" "QuaU.f'l Your P87Chologut," The Insurance Couooil 
Journal, XXVII (April, 1960), 329-.341. - .-
lOlJohn L. McCarl, "The Peycho1ogist in Court. tf 9hi!"!E Ke~ !:!! Review 
XXXIII (June, 1955), 230-240. 
28 
the article mentions the use ot the multi-volume works ot COz:EU! Juris, 
SeC'Ullliwa. Words and Phrases and by now the familiar works ot Wigmore. In 
short, although the article presents marv' articles tor review, each ot these 
articles as suggested by our colIR8nt on certain selections present the same 
t)'pe ot approach aa the !Dulsell approach. At the present time only six 
states recognize the confidential re latiouhips existing between psychologist 
and c11ent.102 In these states the relationahimJ is placed on the same level 
U the attornq-c11ent relationship. Thia is seen in the lew York Statute: 
'!'he contidential. relations and COIII1lUI11cationa between a 
psychologist registered under provisions ot this act and his 
client are placed on the same ba8is as those prori.ded by law 
between attorney and client, and noth1ug in this article sball 
be construed to requ1re &1V such privileged OOl'tI1'l\UUcations to 
be disclosed.10) 
Thus, the concept which is BOUght by the American Psychological A.sociation bas 
not tully reached its objectives. The reason tor this cannot be tully 
determined. One camsot place a point ot emphasis on one particular cauae tor 
the lack ot success in the legal work bY' the APA. This is somewhat under-
standable when one realizes that AMA baa not reached complete recognition in 
all states. Needles. to fJ&7 the pb,yaician has been functioning in society much 
longer tbfm the Pl1Chologtst. Several tactors have struck the writer 1n 
l021he SU: states are Kentucky, Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas, Washington 
and New York. 
lOlDavld W. UNisell, -The Psychologist in Toda,.-s Legal World .... 
Minnesota !!!! Re;;.;;.;...;.vi;;;;.;e;.,;.;.w, XLI (Mq 1957), 735, cit1ug the New York statute. 
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renewing the literature on the subject.. First, David W. touisell is the only 
not3wortby cbaznpion ot the cause ot legal rights ot the psychological 
profession. Secondly, other commentators in the journals present a general 
re-bash of either Louisell eonausnts or a review of the material in Corss Juris 
Secundum or some other encyclopedic source. Thirdly, most ot the ccm:mentatora 
upon analysis disagree in their approaeh to the problem 80 that the reader 
becomes vel',. orten conf'wled. Thia ,""iter h&a noticed man;r errors in mu-
interpretation of the law and its implications. In the article entitled 
"Privileged Communication and the Clinioal Psychologist," the oomment was made 
that it a law recognize. the profession ot p8fChologi8ta then, the state should 
simply extend tbie privilege ot privilege oOlmllUuioatloM, without any regard 
tor the complete developnent ot the concept of privileged communication .s 
it bas 00_ to us through the centuries.1Ob. Moreover, the article declares 
that it the pri vilage cannot be extended on the buis ot Mdical grounds then 
it could be extended on the basis that in some areas medical assistant. have 
been ,,1:Nn this right, so therefore, a peycbologist could be conceived as a 
_c"iea.l ... !stant and therefore invoke this right. A review of chapter twelve 
ot Gutt.macber and Weinhoten'. book, Pseiatrl !!!!! ~ ~ presents a surface 
investigation of the nature ot privileged communicationa. Yet, the book is 
heralded as the authority in the field. To add to this problem., the role of 
l04B. L. D1aroond and H. WGihofen, "Privileged COIIlllWlicat,ion and the 
Clinical. PsycholOgist," Journal 2! Clinical Psxpbology IX (Octobar, 1953), 388. 
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the psychologist bas not been defined under the law in those states which have 
not statutes governing psychologists. Moreover, one will tind no definition 
ot psychologist, psyeootherapist or psychological counselor ex:tsting in the 
accepted legal diot.ionaries suoh as '_,lo_r_d __ s !!E .;.,.;Pbr;,;;;;;.,;;,8S;;..,;e_s. 
Some writers define psychotheraW in terms of the medical field; yet 
legally, in lnat'l)" aeeas and stat<-;s psyohotharapy is not within the 800pe ot the 
medical field. Professor Trout in hie article fl\dlw Define counseling in 
medical terms? fI points out that. in the state of ~fichigan that the practice of 
"psychotherapeutics constitutes the practice of medicine within the meaning of 
the statute prohibiting the practice of medicine without a license. u105 Thus, 
in the state of' Micbigan the practicing or psychotherapeutics falls w-ltllin 
the realm. of' r;li3d1cinaj as such an iudividua1. should be lioensed by the state 
he could be found guilty ot practioing medicine without III license. 
What then is needed and really' what the APA baa been suggesting is that 
we need t.o define under the law the tollow1ng items. First, a definition of 
psyeholol7, am psychotherap,y. Seoondly, we tTIW'It determine its relationship, 
if' a:a;r, to the medical. field. Thirdly, we 11'1U8t determiDe the role or tb;;) 
state 1n licensillg tobe psychologist. Pourthly, we IiIlSt detmnine 14hat the rol 
of' privileged communications should be. In this regard little has been fOl ... th-
coming !'rom the jO\11"l.'1&l.. Most of the articles have simply re-empbasized some 
of the caaes atteot1ng psychologists. Amidst allot this perhaps the prof'e .... 
sion should more explicitly define their terms and their functions as they see 
them. Perhaps, no article olearl,y brings this forth to the reader as Combs 
comments in his article I'?roblems and Definitions in lagislation. If Combs 
i..'1.dicates that the important element of psyobotheraw is the relationship whi 
is established bet1¥::'en th~ client ani! the thi~a:.oist. Ri~ states that the 
relationshi!) is : 
l0500rdon M. Trout, r~Jhy Define Counseling in Medical Terms?n Personnel 
and Guidanoo .Jou!"-:'l~.l :ruIr (~~:ay', 19Sh)" 520. 
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defined dt:rterentl, by each school, but the emphasis he places is on the 
general1.;y accepted taot tbat good therapists in all schools tend to be alike 
in their functions. He points out that ~hothat:'aPY' is: 
essentially' a tea.cb1ng relationship, or it oae preters it so, a 
situation d3Signad to help a olient learn. Payohotherapy is, then 
a learning situation in whioh a therapist seeka to help b1a olient 
to explore and discover a better way ot l1te. Interestingl, enough, 
this 18 exactly' what education attempts to do too. Education also 
seeks through a relationship bet·ween teacher and student to usist 
the pupil to find a better way of Ute. It 18 extremely- ditficult 
to effectively' separate individual therapy from group therapY' of' 
grou.p therapy tr01Il eduoation.l06 
From th1a comment .. oan 1.m!red1atelY' see the d1ttioult1 which emerges when we 
try' to determ1M what the function ot payehother&py should be under the law. 
Tben Combe oorrectly conoludes, 
1'0 do this with the degree ot exactitude required tor inclusion in 
a lioensing law see_ clearly impossible. Many psychologists reel 
it is extreme17 important that the term ·psychotherapy' should be 
written into any' licensing law, reeling that this would assure the 
right ot the psychologist to do PQObotheraw. They feel that this 
wou.ld assure the right ot the psychologist to do psychotherapy. 
Tbe;r feel inclusion of Jl81Chothe1"apy .. a stated tunction ot a 
ps;ychologiat and written into a licensing law would be public 
aokDowledgment that pelObotberapy 18 a legitimate function of 
payebolog,y and would at the same time torestall the attempts of 
oerta1n other proteniona to establ1ab payohother&p7 .. an 
exclus1:ve prerogative. 'l'bis seema like a wise move when it is 
poSSible, but 1.IJ not really' essential in view of the ~aaibi11ty 
of detining psychotherapy. The ditficult:¥" of writing a legally 
lIOrkable def1.n1t1on of psychotherapy 1.IJ a great frustration, but it 
18 also our best protection against the possibility of restricting 
action by amther profes.ion.1OT 
l06A• ~f. Com.bs, If Problems and ne!'initiona in Legulation," Amrican 
P!J'Choloa;!-8t VIII (Sept,ember, 19$3), p. 66. 
l07Ibid. 
-
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So we can euily env.t.slon the difficulty which is betore us when we try to 
accompl.1ah our first goal which is si.rnply detining the position ot the 
psychotherapist. From this we can discern how difficult it :18 to determine 
ita relationship to the nedical field espeoially if the P8)"'Cbologists' training 
18 non-medical in orientation. Moreover, we can grasp the difficulty ot the 
licena1n& board. Finally we lIOuld haft to determine .. t the role would be in 
nprd to privileged oourrrunioations. Although the tirst three considerationa 
have Inade litt.le progreu, the laat contention concerning the relationship of 
the p81Chotherapist and the psycholog1ata and p£*irlleged commun:ication baa 
fOWld iw way into litigation. The leading cue is !.!l.t~ !. !!.~. The court 
declared that the admiaion of testiDlOI\Y of a men\al hospital physician and 
pa;ychiatr1sts who had treated a defendant in a mental hoapital to which the 
detendaAt had been committed until he was meatall.y competent to stand trial 
... in violation ot the statute creating the privilege as to tacta learned by 
a phyaic1an in treating a patient. Alt~ th1s bas been termed the leadi.ng 
case it should be noted that altbough the psychiatrist ma1nta1rDd his right to 
the priY1lege, it cannot tullY' be construed to the realm ot the P8)"'Chologist 
since the doctor held a M.D. What is important, however, is the commentary 
made in the opinion: 
In regard to mental. patients, the policy behind auch a statute is 
part1cu.l.arly clear and strong. Many physical ailments might be 
treated with some degree of etfeet1 veneas by a doctor whom the 
patient did not trust, but a psychiatrist must have his patient' 8 
confidence or he cannot help him. The psyohiatric patient 
conf'idea more utterl,. than anyone else in the world. He exposes 
to the therapist not onl7 what b1s words direetly eXJress, be la,.. 
bare his entire selt, his dre .... bis tantulea, hissw, and his 
shame. Most patienta who urnergo psychotherapy lcnow that this 18 
what will be expected ot them, and that the,. cannot get help except 
on the condition ••• lt would be too mob to expect them to do so if 
the,. knew that all the)" aay--and all that the psychiatrist learns 
from wbat theY' atq--may be revealed to the whole world f'rom a 
witness stand.1OO 
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Therefore, what re."llains is to place this thinking into effect on the level or 
the psychologist. Lou1sell suggests that this should 'be investigated on the 
basis ot the f'amouaWigmore four conditions of privilege. Yet, no commentary 
has btten forthcoming in this 'Yein from the realm of' the P870bological journals. 
However, an Article in the llJortbweatern University Law.Renew analyzes the 
situation trom this point. It is at tbe present time the moat detin1ti va 
attempt to justity the right that l'870hologists should be extended the right ot 
privileged communicationa.109 
Wigmore does not apply bis four cri tara to the p81'Chotherapiat patient 
relationship. Therefore, the article endeavors to apply thea. principles to 
the ps;ycbotberap18t-patient relationship as it is currently envisioned. '!'he 
Wigmore principles are in essence: (1) Doea the cotl1mun:i.cation originate in a 
con1'idenoe? (2) Is the inviolabilitY' of' the confidence ntal to the achieve-
ment of the p1ll'1)Oses of the relationship? (3) Is this relationship one that 
should be foatered? (4) Is the expected injury to the relation, through the 
tear ot the later discourse greater than the expected beD8lit to justice in 
obta1n1ng testimonYillO 
Thus, after a rerlewor the hiStory ot the privilege, the author points 
l08Texlor !_ ~.~. 2~. 398. 
109 Anonymou, "Confidential Communication to .A Psychotherapist: A New 
Testimonial Privilege," tlortbwestern Univers1~ !!! Review XLVII (July-August, 
1952), 384. ~\S TQW~ 
110w1.p1.Ore, ~. ill., p. 527. ~ ~~ 
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out tbat Wigmore would not grant the privilege to the pbysician-patient relatio 
ship, but be would grant it to the priest-penitant. relationship. 'l'beretore, 
the 8Qtbor applies the tour principles to the psychotherapist-client relation-
Ship thusly: 
Since the verY' eseenoe or payobotherapy 18 a confidential personal 
relationship about mattera which the patient is normally reluctant to 
dieCUH, 8.lV' cotamication to a P87Chotherapist dur1ng the course ot a 
collsultatioll are (1) mostly ot a confidential and secret nature, (2) 
less likely and tar more dUticult to obtain it the patient knows that 
they 1111.7 be revealed during the courae ot SOM future law suit, (3) 
the outgrowth ot a relatioll8hip wh1ch should be tostered, (4) the t1J)e 
ot information wb1ch it revealed would produce tar teW%' bemtita to 
justice that consequent injury to the entire field ot psychotherapy.lll 
'1'bu.8, we have the first anal.7s1B or application under lepl evidence ot what 
the role ot the psychologist should be in the realm ot privileged communica-
tion. Yet, the author propans the problem that wbat 1otormation should be 
held oont1dential needs to be clarit1ad. He also maintains that the terms 
pe;,vobotherapist needa to be detined within the words ot the statute. He 
f'urthe.r reels that this intnunity would rest only' with the proteasional 
consultation in psychic or P8)"0botberapeutlc treatment. '!'be author clearly 
diatlJl1'l1shea the point ot counselin& in that be said privileged communicatlon 
could be e:x:teMed to 8. general practitioner it a counseling relationship bad 
been establ18hed. '1'bu.8, be admita that prlvileged oormamicatlon atl11 i. not 
to be enended to the general practitioner and the counseling relationship by 
its Yery nature should merit the right to privileged cOIImIlIlication on the same 
basis u the attorney-client relationship. 
The important quostion seems to be whether or not in litigation such a 
111 ~A8 Anonymoua, 2E. ~., p. ;)V • 
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stand would be accepted. Although the court does not say that it needs the 
above reasoning for distinguishing a need for privileged communication to a 
psychologist over the medical field, there is a case in Illinois (a state whic 
does not recognize the physician-patient relationship as confidential) which 
accepts the fact that a clinical psychologist had a right to privileged 
communication. It should be noted, however, that the cue was heard in the 
Circuit Court of Cook County, in Illinois. Thus, such a decision could be 
appealed and possibly reversed by a higher court. The important point is that 
now some precedent has been established. And in the law the most important 
thing is to have the door opened. The door has been opened. In Bender v. 
Ruvell, an action for alienation of affection, the plaintiff sought to questio. 
his wife's psychiatrist concerning information she had revealed during a serie 
of psychiatric consultations. The psychiatrist refused to testify on the 
grounds that any communications to him in the 80urce of psychotherapy were 
confidential and could not be divulged without the patient's consent. The 
trial court upheld the claim of privilege and excused the psychiatrist from 
test1f'y1.ng.ll2 
Thus, in what appears to be the first decision of its kind without 
statutory support, the court recognized what the psychiatrist had a right not 
a8 an M.D., but as a psychotherapist to be granted the r1~ht of privileged 
communication. What mayor may not develop frODl this trial court ruling 
cannot be determinedJ only time and future litigation can provide the answer. 
112Bender v. Ruvell Civil Dockett 52C 2535 Circuit Court of Cook County, 
Illinois, June ~5, 1952 Judge Harry ?iseto, presiding. 
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Our wbole purpose in this chapter bas been orientated around the notion of 
what is the role of the guidance counselor and protessional imunity_ i-ie 
initiated our remarks by stating that since most of the literature in the field 
endeavored to draw a parallel between the psycho logiat and the gtlidance 
CO\1nSelor, it 'behooved WI to examine what this role is. We AW that only six 
states recognized the right of privileged communication 'by' statute. We have 
'brietly' i.ndicated the need tor a more tborcnlgh &tuqy- on the part ot the psycho-
logical journals ot this role _ We htm3 tried to present some ot the 
difticulties which tace the psychological profession in endeavoring to obtain 
the right of professional immunity_ He have seen that the area of privilege 
communication is perhaps the 'best develope<! legal area at this time. Further-
more, we haw reviewed the basic guiding rules of evidence and we bave seen 
that the psychotherapist oan be granted immunity on the basis of the rules ot 
evidence_ Finally, we ba.'9'9 seen that it 1s possible bued on the rules of 
evidence and not statutory law that the privilege could be granted. However, 
in the interests of the protossion, the role would best be defined if placel 
under statutory law. 
This, then, leads us to the essence of our investigation which is the 
relationship ot the guidance counselor and protessional immunity. The purpose 
tor our rather lengthy history and development of privileged communication in 
general is that to date no specific application has been made of this rule to 
the guidance counselor. Thus. whatever application will be made and what will 
be inferred will have to be forthcoming from the rule as it has developed 
during the last five hundred years. To date, under statutory law, the 
relationship of the guidance counselor to privileged communication is!!!!.. The 
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on~ recognized relationship under common law is the attorney-client relation-
ship. Many inferences have been suggested in the Journals on the role of the 
guidance caunaslor. Most. of these comments have been inferred from what has 
been said about psychologists. At the present time the guidance counselor does 
not possess professional immunity under statutory law. Moreover, he would be 
oompelled to testitY in oourt or he would face contempt of court charges. 
Therefore, our final task is to sift, from all a.vailable l'IlB.terials, just what 
the role of the guidance counselor would be in relationship to professional 
irl'm1wI1ty. 
Our purpose here is to try and determine what implications can be inferred 
for the guidance counselor in relationship to privileged communication. Our 
approach 1s somewhat unique in that rather than draw a comparison from the 
psychological journals on this subject, we shall turn to the correct starting 
point, namely': the legal aspects baaed upon the code of evidence. The 
recognized authority in the field of evidence is Professor \'liigmore. To the 
best ot the writer's knowledge that this is the first time that the Wigmore 
principles will be viewed in relationship to guidance-counselor--elient 
relationship. It is in this application of the Wigmore criteria to the role of 
the guidance counselor that the .. iter hopes 't() sbed some new light on the 
problem of privileged communication and the guidanoe counselor. 
We realize that the role of the guidance counselor is indeed unique. The 
school guidance cO'IlMelor's role as a reading of the professional journals will 
indicate haa not yet been completely defined. The journals are filled with 
cO'flllmntary on surveys concerning what this role should be .113 Our purpose is 
not to be involved with this quandryover the guidance counselor's role. tie 
only have to accept the fact that OM of the functions or the guidance 
tllaordon Klopf, 'lEx,pand.i.ng Role of the High School Counselor," School !!!! 
Society, LXXXVIII (November 5, 1960), 417-19. 
J8 
39 
counselor is counseling. It is the counseling role that we shall oonsider. 
For it is fairly obvious that the guidance role ot the guidance oounselor 
vou.ld not involve a unique one to one relationship with a client which would be 
person oentered. 
Our contentions under granting the privilege to psychologists suggest four 
contentions at investigation for rurther classUication of psychologists so 
too the same contentions need olusification tor the guidance oounselor. The 
first step is to define the term oounseling.. Even Gilbert Wrenn indioates 
that t.he distinction between psychotherapy and oounseling is batfling .114 
Secondly, the reoognition of the profession under the law would be necessary. 
Therefore, although the APGl Code ot Ethios stipulates counseling as a 
profuSion, thU is not surticient in the legal world. llS Thirdly, the 
extension of such a privilep would preclude the right ot the state to license 
the guidance counselor. Thus, the area ot state f'unctions in licensing 
prooesses and standards would bave to be evaluated and undertaken. 
Allot these area could indeed be subjeot. ot separate investigations of 
an extremely exb.au&tift nature. However, our purpose is to examine only'th;' 
role of privileged communication as it relates to the guidance oounselor in his 
role as a counselor. Thus, for our purposes, we shall have to leave these 
areas to othera for consideration and we shall have to asll'U.me that a clear 
lUC• Gilbert 1r4-enn, "Statue and Role or the School Counselor, u American 
Personnel!!!! .;;;,Ou;;.;;i;,.;;dan;.;o,;;;.;;c;.;;.e Journal XXXVI (November, 1957), 180. 
115t'Ethlcal standards," PersODDtl am Qu.idance Journal XL (October, 1961), 206-9. - - no. 
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answer will be forthcoming. 
The first ot 'Wigmore Its criteria for the granting of the right of 
privileged cottrmlnicati.on is that "the corr;;.nu.nication must originate in a confi-
dence that will not be disclosed.,,116 The ethics of the AP~ binds the 
counselor to hold all sucb comzmmication as private and oonfidential and to 
treat all Reb information in a proteHional manner.111 Thws, the client as he 
approaches the counselor in a CO'..meeling relationship is exhorted by too code 
of ethics. This statennnt alone might be sufficient to grant an affirmation to 
Wigmore's tirst criterla. Yet, it beboo~s us tlO further a:xa.rniM the nature 
ot the oo."nmu.l'l1caUon" Fiedler'. studies indicated that of all schools of 
tberaw the most characteristic point of an ideal relationship is that the 
118 
counselor is able "to participate complete in the patient's commt.mication. 
It ia pDtral17 accepted that this communication reters to the construct of 
the self .119 logars in trying to detennne how the counselor can create a 
helping relationship pointe out that the first factor which t1'L1.18t be 
communicated is trustworthinass. t20 If the dean of client-center therapy 
accepts tbe idea that the first element is trustworthiness of the relationship, 
then. the moat char'a.ctaristlc elemant. of the counselini relationship is 
116wi.~re, 22- ~. 527. 
1170000 or EthiCS, 2£. ill. p. 207. 
l18Fred E. Fiedler, ''The concept of an Ideal TherapeutiC Relationship," 
Joprnal 2! Clinical PS12holoU, XIV (August, 19'50), 240. 
119carl R. H.ogers, Client-g~~tere(~ 'l'heraPl (riew York, 1951), p. 136. 
t2~arl ~. aogers, "The Characteristics of a Helping Relationship," 
Personnel !!!! _Clui ........ dan ......... Cf3_ Journal XXXVII (September, 1958), 10. 
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complete participation in the client comnrunication; it would seem that the 
oommunication does originate in a confidence that will not be disclosed. If 
the individual is going to communicate the secrets of his self J it naturally 
follows that a secret would L~ply a confidence which is not to be disclosed. 
Thus, the communication in all probability is oonoeived as a confidential one 
on the part of the client even if' he did not know of the APGA. Cude of Ethics. 
Therefore, I believe we can safely conclude that the conu~rumication must 
originate in a confidence that will not be disclosed .. 
The second j,iigmore principle is that "this element of confidentiality must 
be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenanoe of the relation between 
the parties." vIe have to a degree really ai'firmed this principle as being 
fulfilled in the counseling relationship in our comment on the application of 
the first principle. However, let us elaborate upon this point. The nature of 
the relationship is desoribed by Curran: 
Nor can one catoh in simple description the most subtle and complex 
relationship that must exist between counselor and client, between 
therapist and patient. Here the necessity of mutual inw 1 vamant in 
the human condition is most strikinely den~nstrated. The therapist 
or counselor cannot stand apart in an objective u.nteeling, Cartesian 
way. He must be a complete person, psychosomatically committed to a 
deep, sensitive, and personal communion, a true giving ot self .121 
Bearing these words in mind let us view this commentary: 
12lcharles A. Curran, "Counseling, Psychotherapy, and the Unified Person," 
Journal ot Religion and Health II (January, 1963)109. 
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"The greatest trust, t says lDrd Bacon, 'between men and men, is the 
trust ot giving counsel. For in other confidences men commit the 
parts ot lite; their landa, their goods, their ohildren, their 
credit, some yraotical a.f'ta1r J but to such as the make their 
oounsellors Lsic] they commit the whole, by how much the more they 
are obligated to all taith and integrity.' The condition upon which 
alone this counsel can be given requires particular attention • 
•• • That the whole will not be told to counsel unless the privilege 
is confidential is perfeotly olear. A man who seeks advice and 
seeks it because he believes that he may do so safely, he will rarely 
make disclosures Which may be used against htm •••• 122 
Both quotations bear similarities as to the nature ot the counseling relation-
ship. The greatest gift is the gift ot seU' and it demands a confidenoe and 
trust above all others. '!'he first quotation by Curran is from the twentieth 
century. The seoond ~tation is from the seventeenth oentury and was 
employed in desoribing the deep process the client goes through in commnnicat-
ing to his attorney. rt was employed in urging the application ot the 
attorney-client privilege. The writer felt it ironic that such an excellent 
description of t.ha counseling relationship was dQacribed almo3t th.l.~ee hundred 
,ears ago. And when one stops to thini< of the role of the attorMY, he 
pi."obably teels the l'leed of the clisnt to seek his cou.nsel. Perhaps this is why' 
tile attorlUY recaiveo. the title, counselor. From this evidence, we can safely 
contend that this element of confidentia.lity «lust be essential to the full and 
satisfactory maintenance of the rela.tion between the parties. 
trTbe relation must. be one which in the opinion ot the oorr.mu.nity ought to be 
sedulously fostered, fI comprises the third rule as set forth by ~iigmore •• 1123 
122Wigmore, 2£. ~., p. 541. 
123~., p. 621. 
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The two important words in this rule appear- to be "communitylf and ilsedulously.« 
We m.ight ask ourselves ,just how the cOl1l11IlJ.nity has reacted to the ;:lewlopment of' 
the counseling relatiotl8hip. i;ie could answer by first citing the fact that the 
Congress of the United States has responded favorably under Title V of' the 
~ational Defense Education Act by crea't.ing funds for the establishing of 
Counseling Institu(,es l01' secondary ~chool guidance counselors. itlthough ea.ch 
Institute i8 unique, the erapha.sis is upon counseling rather than upon guidancn. 
Evident~ the community sees a need for fosterillg the counseling relationship. 
The second fact which we cite is the growing number of school counselors 
throughout the United States.124 Indeed, the relation is one whioh the 
community feels should be fostered. 
The word "sedulously" implies the concept diligently pursued. Can t1e not 
infer from the extremely avid interest. of the comnmnity as represented by 
school boards' desire to employ school counselors and the fact that the Congres 
considers counseling part of defense 'I;,hat this relationship is considered to be 
sedulously fostered? 
This leaves us with the examination of the last principle. "'file injury 
that would insus to -"he rl:>lation bY' the disclosure of the communication must be 
greater tr~n the benelit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 
He recognize the tact 'chat purpose of justice is to seek truth. The question 
present f3d. us to use can be examined ontologically. The question presented for 
our examination in this last principle is an age old one of ontological and 
124.Jonel3, 2£. cit., p. 105. 
t~lelogieal concepts. More specif'ioally, is the preHrvation ot the secrecy ot 
the COWIImications more important than tohe ends or objectiws ot society_ The 
crux ot the situation resides in the degree to which we hold the sacredness of' 
tbe client and the etfect that a violation of' this trust would have upon all 
mch future relations both as to this client and the role ot all future 
relationa. 
Profe880l" 'r.'iwnore in col'!lllenting upon the priest-penitent relationship, 
atter chlrqing application of the privilege to the pb;y'sician-patient relation-
sb1p, states that (1) a perm.anent secrecy is essential. to any religious 
conte.lonal system (2) ~ con.teasions wollld not be made if there was a 
chance that they might later be diaclosed in a court of' lawen the prieat.~ 
penitent relationship should be fostered (4) to des'troy the oonfessional would 
be to weaken the backbone ot m&n¥ religions while the gain would be Slight.l25 
Although this paper has silently orltlciZl.ld the method or drawing inferences 
and comparisons, tM point to be brought <Yilt is that Wigmore considers in the 
prien-penitent relationship the effect upon the community if' we were to 
dest.roy the confidence in the relationship. Thus, we do not m.ean to draw an 
inference by analogy but merely' to Me the tact that.Wiamore under the law 
evidence considers it sufficient to SLew that by destroying the cont1<ient1a11.ne 8 
of the relation we wuld destro)" the essence of the relat.ionship, and t.he 
resulting destruction would cl.'"6ate bayoo in the oommunityls participation in t. 
relationship, tr.t.en the rule of privilege should be extended, for in reality the 
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community is benefiting as much as the ir..divi('lual even though complete justice 
might not be acoomplished in a particular litigation. 
Our analysis ot the tirat three rules points out the necessity of 
oonfidentiality to the relationship. As a matter at fact the relationship 
probably wou.ld not exist 1£ this element of trust did not enter into it. If' tb 
oOlllJlWlity fee18 that counseling is 8saential. then it would be sate to assume 
that the oannunioations at a olient should be held oonfidentialJ otherwise, 
olients will not enter into the counseling relationship. Thus, it wou.ld appear 
that it vou.ld be tar better that justioe might not be serwd in order to 
protect the general coatidence which the eonmamltT as entru.eted to eounaeling. 
Tbis 18 the same confidence with which IDrd Bacon cited in the seventeenth 
centur,y. The same confidence which merited the attorney-client relationship. 
With these thoughts 1n mind, we can aately conclude ttat the fourth principle 
can be fulfilled in a counseling relationship. Such would be well and good, if 
our irl'nst:Lgatlon. had not v1.ewed this commsnt by Warren T. Powell, Hall 
confidential information expressed in an interview should be held sacred. It 
should be used on17 with permission ot the counselee unless the welfare ot the 
oomrounity or school is jeopardized ••• tf Here we tind that Powell believes that 
tbe contideuce should be broken. If we admit this concept, then we no longer 
oan fulfill the tourth contention ot \dgLOOre and we must fulfill all f'ou.r in 
order to merit the cloak ot privilege communication. We cannot determine in 
what sense Powell make. this COI'!U:Ilent, perhaps, he advocates this concept so as 
to warn guidance counselor. about their obligations to sooiety especially since 
they do not have the cloak of privilege oommtlnication. The APGA Code, we note, 
make. no such distinction. Perhaps, this 1939 citation has nov been overruled 
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bY' the APGA Code. 
Let WI stop tor a moment and look at the counselor's role if' it were 
accorded privileged comnunication. First, the priest in a. confessional who 
hears a confession of criminal guilt, cannot 00 cannon law report this crime to 
the proper authorit:le8. In those areas ot statutory recognition of the 
pr:lY1lege, he ie eXBmpt from teet:lfying in court ot this tact. Secondly, it 
aeema eYident that if' we make one exception, we are putting a hole in the dike 
ot protection. Thus, this point daterm:lnes the attention ot the counselor. 
From our analya1s it appears that the counselor is going to have to give the 
client full trust in all matters in order to merit proteuional immunity. 
On the other band it might be possible though probably not desirable tor 
the cOWlSeling re lationah1p to make exceptions ot the content ot certain 
COI'IIIlUn1cationa • 
At the present time the guidance counselor is uot covered by the pri'rilege 
ot protessional i.nmtu.nity. Theretore, the counselor should be aware or this and 
the client should be made aware of this fact unless the counselor decides to 
accept the possibility ot facing a contempt. of court charge. Thus, in contl"ut-
iug our inwstigation with the comments or the article by Carter, ve can agree 
with him. that guidance counseling does not coma within the scope of activities 
to which professional inmunity baa been granted. Carter rightfully maintains 
that counseling qualifies &8 a profes8ion. We &gI:"&e but add that such a 
def'inition should be tortboOJJ1ng from the court. or established by definition 
under statutory law. We can agree that counseling is suftering from a lack ot 
such acceptance as gz:oanted to other protessiona. W$ agree with him that the 
counselor is ethically bound to his professional philosophy to consider the 
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clients cournu.n1cat1on as contidential, but we believe that investigation cannot 
agree with his conwent that the client is bound by the legal statutes of all 
the stat.es since statutory law does not exist on thi.a point. \\ie further agree 
that oounselors should know their role under the cloak ot privilege 
communication, howe1'9r, we did not endeavor to investigate the area ot libel 
and slander. We oan agree with his contention that iromnity should be g1:ven to 
the COUDaelor. HolM't"e1", we cannot agree with his oomment that he believes that 
it a cue presents itself the guidanc,~ counselor will receive the right ot 
prinleged communication. We think that our considerations which have not been 
preT10uely presented indicate that tr.e courts might be reluctant to extend this 
privilege. We state this tact looking back on the tive hundred years that 
were needed to develop the attorney-client relationshiPJ we look to the fact 
that the physician-patient relatiol18bi.p is not fully reoognized under 
statutory law nor is the priest-penitent relationship fully recognized. We 
realize that throughout the ages the three professions wore law, medicine and 
the Clmrch. It the law bas been alow to recognize the rights ot these 
profeu1ona I then we can somewhat envision bow slowly they might act in other 
protessiona. The best example is seen in the drive of the American PsycholOgi-
cal A.ssociation. They only have the right ot privileged communication under 
statutory law in six states. Yet, we cannot fOl'get the trial court decision in 
nlinoie. It is indeed possible that it could act as a catalytical agent and 
stimulate the extension of the privilege to the guidance counselor. Carter 
might be alluding to this concept. In this senae, we could concur wi't#h him. 
if/a must also bear in mind the cor.1Mnt cited early by CorP!:!! ~ Secundum that 
the tendency "is not to extend the classes to which the privilege trom 
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disolosure is grantoo, but to restrict the privilege.l26 
The further implications far guidance oounselors is that it is possible 
to 8rpe under the rules of evidence for the extension of the rule of 
privileged communications tor guidance counselors. It is also assumed that the 
counselor will be aware that if the privileged :La accorded to him that the 
privilege ex1ata for the cUent and not for the counselor. Also all of the 
commentaries made under the discu88ion for the development or the privilege 
would be applicable to the counselor. Fo,-" example, it i8 assumed that if' the 
cOl'lll'llm1.cation is overheard by a third party the third party could testify. 
Moreover, it is urged that under further impU.catiOl18 for guidance counselors, 
that Q)D8icieration should be given by the profsHion and the courts in defining 
oounseling and the cowuseling profe88ion a.long with det1n1ng the role or 
licensing the profession. These three factors plq a very important role in 
the future implications for guidance counselors in the privileged conununication 
area. 
12~ores Juris Secundum, 2.2. ~., p. 741. 
CHA1'TER VI 
SUMYIARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
At the onset of this paper we set our goal as two-told--tirBt to eX&"nine 
the historical significance and develoJXllent of the privilege and secondly to 
apply this knowledge t.o the role ot the guidance counselor and protessional 
1mmun1t7. Our investigation pointed out that the origin or the privilege was 
rooted in the Elizabethian period where the privilege originally stemmed from. 
the honor ot the gentleman. As time progressed the courts sought to seek 
justice and '5<dshed to destroy- the privilege. But a new theory bued on the 
Mad ot the cUent tor the privilege arosa. 'l'he new theory envisioned the 
needs ot the client to be 80 great as to seal the lips ot the attorney. These 
two I1X)vements grew side by .ide until we see the emergence ot the rule as we 
know it today. l:fe see that the privilege was not aocorded to the mdioal 
prote.aion except under statutory law in the United States and then with 
various limitations, applications and signi.ticances. We baTe seen that the 
lips ot the physician are sealed only in the oourtroom.. ""''hat he aays outside 
ot the CO\U"troom is governed only by hia ethios. Our concern also bas been 
with the guidance counselor's role in litigation. 
We then v'l. }wed the davelopnent of privileged communication through the 
dec1aions and opinions of the court. We noted that the law cannot compel a 
person to testify once the privilege has been accorded tC' him. The rule 
applies only to that which is privileged and therefore the rule is conditional 
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not absolute. A person must testli"y to that whiah is ai ther c~n or Ob$0r~"a­
ble 'knowledge. Unless there is an 9xpl'essed statute no privilege exists.. The 
interpretation of 'the statute rasts upon the opinion of the courts. Noreover, 
the privilege only applies to those relationships recognized under the law 
even if two individuals feel that their relationship is confidential, it i8 not 
aooorded the priri.lega without statutory recognition. U a third party O't'el"-
bears the conversation t.he third party may testify to what he hears. The 
important fact is that the privilege doea not terminate with the termination 
ot the relation--,hip. We haw seen that the state of Il11nois recognizee no 
privilege exoe?t that of attorney-client.. Finl.lly, we reaUze that the 
privilege under existing law does not apply to the gu1dance oounselor. 
We have then viewed the relationsbip ot the gtlidance counselor and pro-
fessional imn:mity. In order to more tully 'Ul'lderstand tb1a role, we reviewed 
the work of tb3 APA in endeavoring to obtain immunity tor psychologists. Since 
most ot the lttal"ature has been applied to the OO't.UUJeling field, we saw II need 
to exatn1ne the material. Our investigation pointed out II need tor additional 
research and clarification in the field. }J'e concluded that there was a need to 
define the term, "psychology" under the law. Secondly ... there exists a naed to 
derine the relationshJ..p ot psychology to the mdical field. Thirdly', the role 
of state licenaing must be clearly defined. Finally... the role ot the 
psychologist and privileged communication needs to be olarified. 'l'bs crwt of 
the problem in the field ot psychology bas been oaptured by Combs. 'fIe, then 
reviewed the leading Que, T&lo!, !. !!.§.. on the relation of tM PQVb.1atrist 
and the oommunication between him and his patient. \Ie, then, reviewed the role 
of the peyohologist in view of the famous '\<!1gmore principles. OUr investigatio 
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indicat.ed that psychologists should oome under the scope ot privileged ooIlmWli-
cation aucb as six states have already conferred the privilege. A tria.l court 
in Illinois baa set a small but very important precedent when it recognized the 
right of a psyoh1atr18t to be entitled to privileged oommunication on the basis 
ot his psychological background rather than upon his m.edical degree. Our final 
commentary wu that under C01M¥)n lall and existing statutory law, no privilep 
can be applied to guidance COUtUJOlors. 
Th1s commentary brought us to the fact that ,. should endeavor to define 
the role ot the guidance oouuelor in relation to privileged communications. 
The geuaral purpose ot this paper wu to anal.7Ze this role not by the 
comparl.80n method aa bu previowtly been endeavored, but to develop the role 
on the W1gmol"e conditions. tve have endeavored to dellDDStrate that based upon 
the rules ot evidenoe the guidance oounselor should be granted privileged 
OOllIIII1I11cation. tile found, 11owe'9'9r, that in order to merit thiB recognition 
under the law the oounselor 'WOUld have to admit to the tact that all informatio 
must be kept confidential eYeD if it would jeopardize the C01llllmity. It the 
counselor did not do this, be vould weaken hie chances tor reoeiving the oloak 
of protection. Howewr t it baa been suggested that under statutory law the 
legislature could relieve eounaelor anxiety by exclu~ certain types ot 
information. We alao saw that the priv11ege as extended would carry with it al' 
the 11m1tations and olarifications whioh have developed throughout the past 
tiw hundred years. 
\'16 haw sean that the guidance counselor today does not rall under the 
real.r.t of privileged oOl1'lnUllications. The chance that immunity 'WOuld be granted 
1s rather doubtfUl since the oourts have no desire to extend the privilege. 
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However. we have pointed out that under the rules of evidence there exiats no 
legal obstacle far its application. 
~ ra.ay J thus, oonclude that the history and the deve lop;'.ent of the rule of 
privileged comtllUnications has indeed been long. \le oan conclude that under the 
current Amorican jurisprudence the right of privileged cotTlMWlioation does not 
apply to the guidance c0'U.'Il881or. ~"e have concluded that under our analysis and 
application of the ~~igm.ore rules ot evidence tbat such an immunit-,f could be 
vanted. he finally ooncluded that in order tor the oourta to realize a need 
tor eatablisbing such an extension and tor legislatures to enact suoh legisla-
tion the profession and the protessional association should endeavor to assist 
and promote the cause as meb as pos.ible especially by paving the way in the 
areas ot establishing a definition of counseling, Clarifying the role of the 
counseling profession and defining the role of the state in licensing the 
profes.ion. \,Jhile our investigatiDn bas indicated that (1) the relationship of 
Ja'ivilege COJlDW1ioation to the guidance counselor is nil (2) auch a privilege 
-
oould, as irnicated in our investigation by applying the 1Niamore rules tor the 
first time to the guidanae oouwselor--client relationship. and (J) should be 
extended to the guidance COUJ.1Bslor-cl1ent relationship, (4) oertain preliminary 
steps as il'Idi.cated would be helpful in initiating and continuiQg the drive for 
ext,ending this privilege to guidance oounselors wno ~tion as oounselors. 
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